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 1 
The Logical Space of Democracy 
Christian List* 
Final version: 21 July 2011 
Abstract: Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed 
that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but 
sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work 
on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible 
requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism,” “basic majoritarianism,” and “collective 
rationality.” For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these 
three requirements at once; at most two can be met together. This “democratic trilemma” raises the 
question of which requirement to give up. Since different answers correspond to different views 
about what matters most in a democracy, the trilemma suggests a map of the “logical space” in 
which different conceptions of democracy are located. It also sharpens our thinking about other 
impossibility problems of social choice and how to avoid them, by capturing a core structure many 
of these problems have in common. More broadly, it raises the idea of “cartography of logical 
space” in relation to contested political concepts. 
In the run-up to the French Revolution, the polymath and political-science pioneer 
Nicolas de Condorcet discovered some remarkable properties of majority rule.1 One of 
them, described by his celebrated “jury theorem,” is often cited as one of majority rule’s 
greatest strengths: if each voter is better than random at making a correct judgment on a 
yes–no question—say, whether a defendant is guilty, or whether a proposed policy will 
avert a crisis—and different voters are mutually independent, then the probability of a 
correct majority judgment increases and approaches one, as the size of the electorate 
increases.2 So, under the right conditions, majority decisions track the truth. But the other 
property of majority rule that Condorcet discovered, now known as “Condorcet’s 
paradox,” has come to be seen as one of its most notorious weaknesses: even if each 
voter has impeccably rational preferences, the majority preferences can still be irrational. 
                                                 
*
 This paper is based on a talk I have given in several places, including the Princeton Center for Human 
Values (2006), the Philosophy Program at the Australian National University (2006), Boğaziçi University, 
Istanbul (2008), the Vera List Center for Art and Politics at The New School, New York (2010), and the 7th 
Conference on Collective Intentionality, Basel University (2010). I am grateful to the audiences there and 
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Valentini for continuing feedback and encouragement.  
1
 See Nicolas de Condorcet, Essay sur l'Application de l'Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendue à la 
Pluralité des Voix (Paris, 1785), and for an English translation and commentary, Iain McLean and Arnold 
B. Urken (eds.), Classics of Social Choice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). 
2
 See, among many others, Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld (1983), “Thirteen 
theorems in search of the truth,” Theory and Decision 15 (1983): 261–78; Philip J. Boland, “Majority 
Systems and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” The Statistician 38 (1989): 181–89; and Christian List and 
Robert E. Goodin, “Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 9 (2001): 277–306. 
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Suppose, for example, a third of the electorate prefers option A to option B to option C; a 
second third prefers B to C to A; and the last third prefers C to A to B. Then majorities 
prefer A to B, B to C, and yet C to A, a “cyclical” and thus inconsistent outcome.   
The significance of Condorcet’s insights cannot be overstated. They have inspired 
vast bodies of work in philosophy, political science, and economics, with repercussions 
well beyond these fields. Much of the recent literature on “epistemic democracy” can be 
traced back to Condorcet’s jury theorem,3 and Condorcet’s paradox is an important 
precursor of many later discoveries in social choice theory, notably Kenneth Arrow’s and 
Amartya Sen’s Nobel-Prize-winning impossibility and possibility results on the 
aggregation of preferences.4 Through these influences, Condorcet’s work has left its mark 
on how we think about collective decision making. 
The aim of this paper is to revisit Condorcet’s paradox from a fresh perspective, 
namely that of recent work on the aggregation of judgments and other propositional 
attitudes,5 and to draw broader lessons for the theory of democracy. I will recast the 
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 Contributions include Joshua Cohen, “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,” Ethics 97 (1986): 26–
38; Jules L. Coleman and John Ferejohn, “Democracy and Social Choice,” Ethics 97 (1986): 6–25; David 
Estlund, Jeremy Waldron, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld, “Controversy: democratic theory and the 
public interest: Condorcet and Rousseau revisited,” American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 1317–
40; Estlund, “Making Truth Safe for Democracy,” in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean 
Hampton and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 71–100; Estlund, 
“Beyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority,” in Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge/MA: MIT 
Press, 1997), pp. 173–204; and List and Goodin, “Epistemic Democracy.” In his book, Democratic 
Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Estlund distances 
himself from Condorcet’s jury theorem, but still acknowledges the need to frame his discussion in relation 
to it. 
4
 E.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, (New York: Wiley, 1951/1963), and 
Amartya K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970). A review of 
the literature is beyond the scope of this paper. William Riker sparked a debate by arguing that these 
problems challenge the meaningfulness of democracy; see Liberalism against Populism (San Francisco: 
W.H. Freeman and Co., 1982). On the frequency of Condorcet cycles under some simple assumptions, see 
William V. Gehrlein, “Condorcet’s Paradox,” Theory and Decision 15 (1983): 161–97. 
5
 See, among many other works, Christian List and Philip Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An 
Impossibility Result,” Economics and Philosophy 18 (2002): 89–110; List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of 
Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared,” Synthese 140 (2004): 207–35; Marc Pauly and Martin 
van Hees, “Logical constraints on judgement aggregation,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (2006): 569–
85; Franz Dietrich, “Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems,” Journal of Economic Theory 126 
(2006): 286–98; Dietrich, “A generalised model of judgment aggregation,” Social Choice and Welfare 28 
(2007): 529–65; Dietrich and List, “Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation,” Social Choice and Welfare 
29 (2007): 19–33; Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe, “Abstract Arrovian Aggregation,” Journal of 
Economic Theory 145 (2010): 467–94; and Elad Dokow and Ron Holzman, “Aggregation of binary 
evaluations,” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010): 495–511. This literature draws on related work on 
the “doctrinal paradox” in law and economics, especially Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, 
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paradox as a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy, which 
I will call “robustness to pluralism,” “basic majoritarianism,” and “collective rationality.” 
For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure can meet 
these three requirements at once; at most two of them can be met together. I will call this 
problem the “democratic trilemma.” Condorcet’s original paradox provides only one 
illustration of this conflict, and its relationship to the more general trilemma will become 
clear in the course of the argument. 
The democratic trilemma raises the question of which requirement to give up. Since 
different answers to this question correspond to different views about what matters most 
in a democracy, the trilemma can be used to draw a map of the logical space in which 
different conceptions of democracy are located. A conception that relaxes basic 
majoritarianism, for example, is very different from one that relaxes robustness to 
pluralism or collective rationality. The resulting map illuminates some of the trade-offs 
we face when we try to find a compelling conception of democracy. The trilemma also 
sharpens our thinking about other impossibility results of social choice theory, including 
some of Arrow’s and Sen’s famous theorems, and how to avoid them. It captures a core 
structure many of these problems have in common.  
While the technical ideas underlying this paper are well-established in existing 
social-choice-theoretic work (especially on judgment aggregation), the paper’s 
contribution lies in the way these ideas are used to obtain a novel map of the logical 
space of democracy. Despite abstracting away from many details of real-world collective 
decision problems, this alerts us to some surprising trade-offs in the design of democratic 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Unpacking the Court,” Yale Law Journal 96: 82–117; and Kornhauser and Sager, “The One and the 
Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts,” California Law Review 81 (1993): 1–59. The literature also 
draws on related work in abstract aggregation theory, especially Robert Wilson, “On the Theory of 
Aggregation,” Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975): 89–99; Ariel Rubinstein and Peter C. Fishburn, 
“Algebraic Aggregation Theory,” Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986): 63–77; and Nehring and Puppe, 
“Strategyproof Social Choice on Single-Peaked Domains: Possibility, Impossibility and the Space 
Between,” working paper (University of California, Davis). For contributions addressed to political 
philosophers, see, e.g., Pettit, “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma,” Philosophical Issues 
(supplement to Nous) 11 (2001): 268–99; Bruce Chapman, “Rational Aggregation,” Politics, Philosophy 
and Economics 1 (2002): 337–54; Kornhauser and Sager, “The Many as One: Integrity and Group Choice 
in Paradoxical Cases,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004): 249–76; List and Pettit, “On the Many as 
One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 377–90; and List, “The 
Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason,” Ethics 116 (2006): 362–402. For a survey, see List and Puppe, 
“Judgment aggregation: a survey,” The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, ed. Paul Anand, Prasanta 
Pattanaik and Clemens Puppe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 457–82. 
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decision procedures. Over and above this specific contribution, my broader aim is to 
illustrate the relevance of the axiomatic method for democratic theory more generally 
(beyond formal social choice theory), and to support the idea of “cartography of logical 
space” in relation to contested political concepts. The present approach to mapping out 
the logical space of democracy provides just one example of what such a cartographic 
exercise might look like. If readers find this approach natural and elegant, and perhaps 
worth replicating in the case of other contested political concepts, the paper will have 
achieved its purpose. 
I. THE UNIVERSE OF COLLECTIVE DECISION PROBLEMS 
Collective decision problems occur at many levels of social organization. While national 
and local elections, referenda and legislative decisions are the most familiar examples, 
collective decision problems occur in a great variety of social units, ranging from 
families, local communities and private organizations at one end of the spectrum to 
international and global bodies such as the European Union and the United Nations 
Security Council at the other. Outside conventional political contexts, collective decisions 
are also made in epistemic contexts, such as in expert panels, collegial courts, groups of 
scientific collaborators, and fact-finding commissions.  
To model decision problems in general, it is useful to think of them as involving the 
formation of intentional attitudes towards certain propositions, which subsequently 
determine the decision makers’ actions. Depending on the context, these attitudes can be 
“representational,” such as beliefs, or “motivational,” such as preferences. 
Representational attitudes encode the way an agent represents the world as being, while 
motivational attitudes encode the way the agent wants the world to be. A rational agent 
then acts, roughly speaking, so as to satisfy his or her motivational attitudes in 
accordance with his or her representational attitudes.6  
For example, if I prefer to drink coffee and believe there is coffee available next 
door, I may rationally act by going there, assuming no complicating factors. This picture 
                                                 
6
 For a discussion of the roles of intentional attitudes in individual and collective agency, see List and 
Pettit, Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). The underlying model of agency goes back to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
reprinted from the original and edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1739/1896). See also 
Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge/MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
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applies not just to individuals but also to groups making decisions. A state troubled by 
poverty may form the preference to lift people out of poverty, and the belief that a 
particular policy will achieve this goal, and then act by adopting the policy. Political 
decisions usually involve the formation of motivational attitudes, such as the preference 
to reduce poverty or to increase economic growth, and epistemic decisions involve the 
formation of representational attitudes, such as the belief that a defendant is guilty, or that 
current greenhouse gas emissions will lead to a global temperature increase. On an 
epistemic interpretation of politics, political decisions resemble, or centrally involve, 
epistemic decisions, but I do not need to take a stand on this issue here. 
Regardless of whether representational or motivational attitudes are formed, most 
decision problems are subject to certain constraints of consistency. If one forms the belief 
that p and the belief that if p then q, for instance, one cannot consistently form the belief 
that not-q as well. Here the consistency constraints come from logic. Similarly, if one 
prefers A to B and B to C, one cannot consistently prefer C to A, as in Condorcet’s 
paradox. In this case, the consistency constraints are given by the standard rationality 
requirements on preferences, especially transitivity.  
While Condorcet—and later Arrow, Sen and most of contemporary social choice 
theory—focused on decision problems involving the ranking of options, we can lift this 
restriction by considering a larger class of decision problems, defined in terms of the 
formation of propositional attitudes. A decision problem in this sense is given by: 
(i) a set of propositions, together with their negations, which are to be accepted 
or rejected—call this set the “agenda”—and  
(ii) some constraints specifying which combinations of propositions can be 
consistently accepted and which not.7  
Solving the decision problem then requires arriving at a set of accepted propositions that 
meets the specified consistency constraints and, ideally, also the constraint of 
“completeness.” The latter requires that, for every proposition–negation pair on the 
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 For different versions of this logic-based model of a decision problem, at increasing levels of generality, 
see List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments,” Dietrich, “A generalised model of judgment 
aggregation,” and Dietrich and List, “The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory,” 
Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (2010): 215–34. For a related abstract model not based on logic, see 
Nehring and Puppe, “Abstract Arrovian Aggregation,” and Dokow and Holzman, “Aggregation of binary 
evaluations.” 
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agenda, either the proposition or its negation be accepted. The interpretation of 
“acceptance” and “rejection” depends on the kind of attitudes in question. In the 
representational case, accepting a proposition means believing it to be true; in the 
motivational case, it can mean something like desiring or preferring it to be true.  
Expressed in this model, the agenda in a preference aggregation problem as 
considered by Condorcet and Arrow contains pairwise ranking propositions of the form:  
• “A is preferred (or preferable) to B,”  
• “B is preferred (or preferable) to C,”  
• “A is preferred (or preferable) to C,”  
and the reverse of each.8 Accepting all three propositions, for example, which 
corresponds to preferring A to B to C, is deemed to be consistent, while accepting the 
first two propositions and the negation of the last is not, since it involves a violation of 
transitivity: a preference for A over B, for B over C, and yet for C over A. Any ranking of 
a set of options in an order of preference can be formally translated into a set of accepted 
propositions of the kind just introduced, where the rationality constraints on preferences, 
such as transitivity, turn into corresponding consistency constraints on the admissible 
acceptance–rejection patterns across propositions. 
In a paradigmatic epistemic decision problem, to give an example not involving 
rankings, the agenda might contain:  
• an empirical premise, such as “CO2 emissions are above a certain threshold,”  
• a causal claim, such as “if emissions are above that threshold, then the global 
temperature will increase by 2 degrees Celsius,” and  
• a prediction, such as “the global temperature will increase by 2 degrees Celsius,”  
and their negations. Here again, accepting all three propositions is consistent, while 
accepting the first two and the negation of the last is not, this time interpreting 
consistency as in standard propositional logic. Since the need to arrive at collective 
                                                 
8
 This construction is formally given in List and Pettit, “Two Impossibility Results Compared,” and 
Dietrich and List, “Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation,” but the idea of a propositional 
representation of preferences goes back to Georges-Théodule Guilbaud, “Theories of the General Interest, 
and the Logical Problem of Aggregation,” in Readings in Mathematical Social Science, ed. Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld and Neil W. Henry (Cambridge/MA: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 262–307; and even to Condorcet’s 
Essay. The present representation can be interpreted in various ways, as implicit in the contrast between 
“preferred” and “preferable” in the formulation of ranking propositions; the details do not matter for 
present purposes. 
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judgments on logically connected issues arises in many decision-making bodies, from 
courts and expert panels to commercial corporations and other purposive organizations, 
the kinds of decision problems not based on rankings are common in the real world.  
It should be evident that a large class of collective decision problems can be 
expressed in the present model: not just the preference ranking problems of standard 
social choice theory but also all decision problems in which “true–false” or “yes–no” 
judgments have to be made on a set of propositions, including very complex ones. Thus 
we have at our disposal a very general model of collective decision problems.9 The 
challenge now is to find a procedure that a group can use to solve such problems. 
II. THE UNIVERSE OF COLLECTIVE DECISION PROCEDURES  
Just as there are many different collective decision problems, so there are many different 
collective decision procedures, ranging from democratic and participatory ones to 
hierarchical and even dictatorial ones. How can we think about such procedures 
systematically?  
Decision procedures can be studied as objects in their own right. This is the subject-
matter of social choice theory. Historically, social choice theorists studied the properties 
of specific such procedures. While Condorcet focused on the properties of majority rule, 
his contemporary Jean-Charles de Borda advocated an alternative, which ranks options 
by summing up the “scores” implicit in the voters’ rankings of them, such as a score of k 
for each voter’s top-ranked among k options, a score of k–1 for the second-ranked option, 
and a score of 1 for the bottom option.10 Others similarly studied decision procedures 
they considered interesting or politically salient. In the 19th century, for example, Charles 
Dodgson, better known as Lewis Carroll, devoted some of his mathematical work—his 
                                                 
9
 The model can be further generalized so as to capture decision problems that involve the formation of 
non-binary propositional attitudes, as discussed in Dietrich and List, “The aggregation of propositional 
attitudes.” But since real-world democratic decisions typically take a discrete—especially binary—form 
(requiring the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions, or the ranking of certain options in an order 
of preference), I set the non-binary case aside here. 
10
 For an English translation of, and commentary on, Borda’s proposal, see McLean and Urken, Classics of 
Social Choice. 
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day job while he was not writing Alice in Wonderland—to investigating electoral systems 
based on proportional representation.11  
But we can also study decision procedures in another way. Instead of focusing on 
specific procedures, we can consider the logical space of all possible decision procedures, 
and ask which of them satisfy certain requirements. This is the “axiomatic” approach 
pioneered by Arrow.12 Here, however, I will apply the approach not just to preference 
ranking problems, which Arrow considered, but to the larger class of decision problems 
introduced in the last section.13 Suppose, then, a group of individuals seeks to arrive at 
collective attitudes, each in the form of acceptance or rejection, on a given agenda of 
propositions. We can model a decision procedure as an input–output scheme, formally a 
function, which takes the individuals’ attitudes towards the relevant propositions as input 
and produces collective attitudes as output, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: A decision procedure 
Majority rule, under which the collective attitude towards any proposition is the 
attitude held by the majority of individuals, is only one example of such a function, and 
there are many other possibilities. But once we have also thought of various 
supermajority and unanimity rules, dictatorial rules (under which one individual’s 
attitudes always prevail), and perhaps weighted majority rules (under which different 
people have different weights in determining the collective attitudes), our intuitions tend 
                                                 
11
 See Iain S. McLean, Alistair McMillan, and Burt L. Monroe (eds.), A mathematical approach to 
proportional representation: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). 
12
 For an excellent discussion of the axiomatic method in social choice theory, see William Thomson, “On 
the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation,” Social Choice 
and Welfare 18 (2000): 327–86. 
13
 I thereby follow the technical literature on the aggregation of judgments and other propositional attitudes, 
as briefly reviewed in earlier notes. 
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to run out, and we find it harder to come up with further examples. How large, then, is the 
logical space of possible decision procedures for a given collective decision problem?  
A simple example shows that, notwithstanding the limits of our imagination, it is 
truly enormous. Suppose a three-member group wishes to make a decision between just 
two options: whether A is preferable to B or the other way round. Table 1 lists all 8 (=23) 
possible combinations of individual attitudes on this issue, which we can here simply 
interpret as the individuals’ votes. To specify a decision procedure, we must assign to 
each combination of votes (each row of the table) a collective choice; so we must 
complete the right-most column by replacing each question mark with a choice of A or B. 
 Individual 1 Individual 2 Individual 3 Collective 
1st possible combination A A A ? 
2nd possible combination A A B ? 
3rd possible combination A B A ? 
4th possible combination A B B ? 
5th possible combination B A A ? 
6th possible combination B A B ? 
7th possible combination B B A ? 
8th possible combination B B B ? 
Table 1: Possible combinations of individual attitudes 
Each way of completing the column thus corresponds to one particular decision 
procedure. If we replace every question mark with an A, for instance, we obtain the 
“constant-A procedure,” under which the group always prefers A to B, regardless of its 
members’ attitudes—a logically possible but obviously unattractive procedure. An 
equally unattractive possibility is the “constant-B procedure,” where every question mark 
is replaced by a B, again ignoring all individuals’ attitudes. Majority rule is defined by 
replacing any question mark with an A when there are more As than Bs in the relevant 
row, and with a B otherwise. A dictatorship of one individual is defined by pasting a 
fixed individual’s attitudes into the right-most column. If the right-most column 
replicates individual 1’s column, for instance, then individual 1 always determines the 
group’s choice between A and B. An even more perverse possibility is to put an A in the 
right-most column whenever there is a B in individual 1’s column and vice versa. This 
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corresponds to an “inverse dictatorship,” under which the group’s attitudes are always the 
opposite of a fixed individual’s attitudes.  
Since there are two possible collective choices, A or B, for each of the eight rows, 
there are 28 ways of completing the table, and hence 256 possible decision procedures. 
This is already a sizeable number, given that we are only dealing with a three-member 
group making a single binary decision. What happens if we increase the group size or 
consider more complex decision problems? 
Suppose the group size grows from three to ten, but we keep the restriction to two 
options. By a straightforward extension of the reasoning just outlined, the number of 
logically possible decision procedures increases from 28 to 21024, since there are now 
1024 (=210) possible combinations of individual attitudes, corresponding to a table of 
1024, rather than 8, rows. Thus the number of possible decision procedures in this case is: 
17976931348623159077293051907890247336179769789423065727343008
11577326758055009631327084773224075360211201138798713933576587
89768814416622492847430639474124377767893424865485276302219601
24609411945308295208500576883815068234246288147391311054082723
7163350510684586298239947245938479716304835356329624224137216. 
This exceeds the number of elementary particles in the universe according to standard 
estimates, and we have not even considered more complex decision problems or larger 
group sizes. So we are faced with a dramatic combinatorial explosion: the logical space 
of possible decision procedures grows exponentially with increasing group size and 
increasing complexity of the decision problem.14  
How can we make sense of this vast logical space? How can we ensure, in 
particular, that our choice of procedure is not merely ad hoc, or driven by a lack of 
imagination? This is where the axiomatic method can come into play. By specifying 
some requirements that any “good” decision procedure is expected to satisfy, we can 
narrow down the space of possibilities. Let me introduce three such requirements. 
                                                 
14
 Generally, if there are x admissible combinations of individual inputs and y admissible collective outputs, 
there are yx possible decision procedures. If each individual has z different choices, then x can be further 
expressed as zn, where n is the group size. In the examples just discussed, y = 2, z = 2, and n = 3 or n = 10. 
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III. THREE INITIALLY PLAUSIBLE REQUIREMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 
Although there is considerable disagreement on what exactly a decision procedure must 
look like in order to count as democratic, the following seem to be widely accepted 
necessary (though arguably not sufficient) requirements.   
Robustness to pluralism: The decision procedure is able to function under 
conditions of pluralism, that is, it accepts as admissible input any possible 
combination of individual attitudes on the propositions on the given agenda, 
subject only to the constraints of individual consistency and completeness.15  
In particular, no combinations of individual attitudes must be ruled out in advance as 
admissible inputs to the decision procedure, so long as they satisfy some minimal 
constraints of formal rationality. One might ideally want the procedure to cope even with 
inputs violating those constraints, since good democratic decisions are needed regardless 
of how rational people’s attitudes are. But robustness to pluralism turns out to be very 
demanding already, and thus strengthening it further may not be feasible.   
Basic majoritarianism: A necessary condition for the collective acceptance 
of any proposition on the agenda is its majority acceptance.  
This majoritarian requirement is a “basic” one as it takes majority acceptance to be only a 
necessary condition for the collective acceptance of any proposition, not automatically a 
sufficient condition. Basic majoritarianism is thus less demanding than the standard 
majority principle and compatible with a wide range of decision procedures apart from 
majority rule itself.16 Supermajority or unanimity rules, for instance, which require more 
than majority support for the acceptance of any proposition, also meet the requirement.17  
                                                 
15
 This is the universal-domain requirement in the literature on judgment or attitude aggregation. In the 
special case of preferences, it reduces to Arrow’s universal domain condition. 
16
 Notice, further, that basic majoritarianism does not imply some of the other standard conditions 
commonly used to prove impossibility results in formal work on aggregation, such as “independence” or 
“systematicity.” Independence requires that the collective attitude on each proposition depend only on 
individual attitudes on that proposition, not on individual attitudes on other conditions. Systematicity adds 
to this the requirement that the pattern of dependence be the same for all propositions. 
17
 For discussions of such rules, see, e.g., Goodin and List, “Special Majorities Rationalized,” British 
Journal of Political Science 36 (2006): 213–41; and Dietrich and List, “Judgment aggregation by quota 
rules: majority voting generalized,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (2007), 391–424. By contrast, 
weighted majority rules, under which different individuals have different voting weights, do not generally 
satisfy the present basic majoritarian requirement. Harry Brighouse and Marc Fleurbaey advocate such 
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Collective rationality: The decision procedure produces as collective output 
consistent and complete attitudes on the propositions on the agenda.18 
Collective rationality requires the procedure to deliver what may count as a full solution 
to any decision problem brought to it: a set of accepted propositions that respects the 
relevant consistency constraints (the “consistency” part) and leaves no proposition–
negation pairs on the agenda undecided (the “completeness” part). 
A lot could be said about each of the three requirements, and in the end we may 
wish to revise or redefine them. For the moment, I will treat them as “democratic 
platitudes” capturing commonly held intuitions about what a democratic procedure 
should minimally look like.19 As Robert Dahl distinguished between narrower and 
broader notions of democracy in his classic account of procedural democracy, so the 
present requirements might be best thought of as prima facie necessary conditions on a 
democratic procedure narrowly construed, that is, on a procedure that is democratic 
relative to a given agenda of issues and a given demos of decision-makers.20 Most people 
will expect a full-blown democracy to meet stronger requirements, including 
requirements on the specification of the demos and the composition of the agenda. 
                                                                                                                                                 
rules on the grounds of a particular proportionality principle; see “Democracy and Proportionality,” 
Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2008): 137–55. They suggest that, in certain collective decisions, each 
decision-maker’s voting weight should be proportional to his or her “stake” in the decision. Depending on 
the precise pattern of stakes, and on whether a simple or qualified version of weighted majority voting is 
used, the resulting decision procedure may well overrule the majority attitude—not, however, the attitude 
supported by more than half of the total voting weight. Although Brighouse and Fleurbaey’s proposal may 
require a revision in the formulation of “basic majoritarianism,” it is not generally immune to the kinds of 
technical difficulties illustrated by what I call the “democratic trilemma.” 
18
 This is the collective-rationality requirement in the literature on judgment aggregation. Again, in the 
special case of preferences, it reduces to Arrow’s ordering condition. 
19
 For present purposes, I set aside the distinct case of procedures for ranking distributions of certain goods 
or units of welfare in an order of social preference. The application of social choice theory to such 
problems of distributive justice is very important, but raises somewhat different challenges as compared to 
the paradigmatic cases of democratic decision making (in elections, referenda, legislatures, committees 
etc.). On the justice-theoretic side of social choice theory, see, e.g., John E. Roemer, Theories of 
Distributive Justice (Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); and Marc Fleurbaey, Fairness, 
Responsibility, and Welfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
20
 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, “Procedural Democracy,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 5th series, ed. 
Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). 
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IV. THE DEMOCRATIC TRILEMMA 
Can we find a decision procedure that meets the three requirements? In light of the sheer 
size of the logical space of possibilities, one would expect to find at least one such 
procedure, and possibly many. Surprisingly, however, the following result holds: 
The democratic trilemma: For all but the simplest collective decision 
problems, there exists no decision procedure satisfying robustness to 
pluralism, basic majoritarianism, and collective rationality. At most two of 
these requirements can be met at once.21 
I sketch a general proof in the Appendix. To illustrate the trilemma more informally, let 
me give some simple examples of how the conflict between the three requirements arises. 
Example 1: weapons of mass destruction 
Suppose a multi-member government is making judgments on the following three 
propositions and their negations:22 
• “Country X has weapons of mass destruction.” 
• “We should invade country X if and only if it has weapons of mass destruction.” 
• “We should invade country X.” 
Since different cabinet members may disagree on these issues, the government needs a 
procedure to arrive at its collective judgments. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
there exists a procedure satisfying robustness to pluralism, basic majoritarianism, and 
collective rationality. I will show that this supposition leads to a contradiction. 
By robustness to pluralism, the procedure must be able to cope with conditions of 
pluralism. In particular, it must accept as admissible input the combination of individual 
judgments shown in Table 2. Here one third of the group holds that there are weapons of 
mass destruction and that the presence of such weapons is necessary and sufficient for an 
                                                 
21
 As formally stated here, this result is more general than the familiar observation that majority voting does 
not generally secure consistent collective attitudes, which has been shown at different levels of generality 
in the literature on judgment aggregation. For the versions of this standard result most closely related to the 
present point, see List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments,” Dietrich and List, “Judgment 
aggregation by quota rules,” Nehring and Puppe, “The structure of strategy-proof social choice – Part I: 
General characterization and possibility results on median spaces,” Journal of Economic Theory 135 
(2007): 269–305; and Nehring and Puppe, “Abstract Arrovian Aggregation.” Note that the present 
contribution is not so much the formal result, but rather its substantive interpretation. 
22
 This example was introduced in Dietrich and List, “Judgment aggregation by quota rules.” 
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invasion, and therefore supports an invasion. A second third agrees that the presence of 
weapons is necessary and sufficient for an invasion but thinks that there are no such 
weapons, and thus opposes an invasion. The final third does not think that there are any 
weapons but does not consider their presence necessary for an invasion, and can therefore 
consistently support an invasion on different grounds, for example for economic reasons. 
 
  “There are WMD.” “We should invade if and 
only if there are WMD.” 
“We should 
invade.” 
1/3 of the individuals Yes Yes Yes 
1/3 of the individuals No Yes No 
1/3 of the individuals No No Yes 
Table 2: The cabinet members’ judgments 
What should the collective judgments be? By basic majoritarianism, the collective 
judgment on each proposition, including any negated proposition, must either be the 
majority judgment on the proposition or be silent on it. So the government as a whole can 
either form the view that there are no weapons of mass destruction, following the 
majority, or take no opinion on this issue; adopting the collective view that there are 
weapons would breach basic majoritarianism. Similarly, the government can either form 
the view that an invasion should take place if and only if there are such weapons, again 
following the majority, or take no opinion on this issue; it cannot accept the negation of 
the proposition consistently with basic majoritarianism. Finally, the government can 
either form the view that an invasion should take place, following the majority, or take no 
opinion on this issue; accepting the negation would go against basic majoritarianism. 
Collective rationality, however, will not be satisfied unless the collective judgments 
are both consistent and complete. The completeness requirement rules out the possibility 
of taking no opinion on some proposition–negation pairs on the agenda, and thus the 
collective view must be that there are no weapons of mass destruction, that the presence 
of such weapons is necessary and sufficient for an invasion, but that there should be an 
invasion nonetheless. This violates consistency, and so the decision procedure does not 
satisfy collective rationality, contrary to our supposition. 
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Example 2: global warming 
Suppose an expert panel, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is 
making judgments on the following three propositions and their negations: 
• “The atmospheric CO2 concentration will increase above 500 ppm by 2050.” 
• “If atmospheric CO2 increases above this level by 2050, the Greenland ice shield 
will melt by 2150.” 
• “The Greenland ice shield will melt by 2150.” 
Different experts may, of course, disagree on these propositions, and the panel may wish 
to resolve these disagreements democratically. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
there exists a decision procedure satisfying robustness to pluralism, basic majoritarianism 
and collective rationality. As before, robustness to pluralism requires the procedure to 
cope with any individual inputs fed into it, assuming they are consistent and complete, 
and so it must admit the combination of judgments shown in Table 3, where each expert 
holds a perfectly consistent and complete set of views on the issues in question. 
 “CO2 will increase 
above 500 ppm.” 
“If CO2 increases above this level, 
the Greenland ice will melt.” 
“The Greenland 
ice will melt.” 
Expert 1 Yes Yes Yes 
Expert 2 No Yes No 
Expert 3 Yes No No 
Table 3: The experts’ judgments 
By basic majoritarianism, the expert panel must either adopt the majority judgment 
on each proposition on the agenda or be silent on it. In light of the majority views, the 
expert panel must therefore accept the judgment that atmospheric CO2 will increase 
above 500 ppm by 2050, or be silent on this issue. Likewise, it must either hold that if 
CO2 increases above this level, then the Greenland ice shield will melt by 2150, or be 
silent on this issue. And finally, it must either hold that the Greenland ice shield will not 
melt by 2150, or be silent on this issue. Basic majoritarianism precludes the collective 
acceptance of any proposition rejected by a majority. 
Collective rationality, as before, requires the collective judgments to be both 
consistent and complete. Again, completeness rules out the possibility of forming no 
judgment on some proposition–negation pairs on the agenda, and hence the expert panel 
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is constrained to judge that CO2 will increase above 500 ppm, that if CO2 increases above 
this level, then the Greenland ice will melt, and yet that the ice will not melt, an 
inconsistent set of judgments. As in the earlier example, the decision procedure fails to 
satisfy collective rationality, contrary to our supposition. 
Condorcet’s paradox as a special case 
Before I turn to the three “horns” of the trilemma, I should clarify its relationship with 
Condorcet’s paradox. As noted, Condorcet focused on decision problems involving the 
ranking of options, rather than the more general class of decision problems considered 
here. But as also noted, the decision problems that give rise to Condorcet’s paradox can 
be re-expressed in the present model, by taking the agenda to contain the propositions “A 
is preferred/preferable to B,” “B is preferred/preferable to C,” “A is preferred/preferable 
to C,” and their opposites. What are the properties of this agenda?  
Its central feature for present purposes is that it permits the occurrence of patterns 
of consistent and complete individual attitudes for which the resulting majority attitudes 
are inconsistent relative to the standard constraints on preferences, especially transitivity. 
The combination of preferences that Condorcet used to illustrate this point involves a 
third of the electorate preferring A to B to C, a second third preferring B to C to A, and 
the last third preferring C to A to B. When translated into the present framework, as 
shown in Table 4, these preferences are structurally similar to the experts’ attitudes in 
Table 3 above, though of course interpretationally different. So, by essentially the same 
argument as in the government and expert-panel examples, there is no decision procedure 
satisfying robustness to pluralism, basic majoritarianism and collective rationality here.23 
                                                 
23
 Expressed in terms of the formal conditions for the democratic trilemma stated in the Appendix, the 
present agenda has a minimally inconsistent subset of three propositions: the set consisting of “A is 
preferred/preferable to B,” “B is preferred/preferable to C,” “C is preferred/preferable to A.” This set is 
inconsistent relative to the standard constraints on preferences, by violating transitivity, and minimally so, 
since the removal of any of its elements breaks the preference cycle and thereby restores consistency. 
Generally, if we wish to rank k options in an order of preference, the largest minimally inconsistent subset 
of the agenda contains k propositions, corresponding to a preference cycle of length k. This shows that, like 
Condorcet’s paradox, the democratic trilemma applies to a preference aggregation problem if and only if 
there are three or more options to be ranked. See also List and Pettit, “Two Impossibility Results 
Compared,” Dietrich and List, “Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation,” and “Judgment aggregation by 
quota rules.” 
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 “A is pref. to B.” “B is pref. to C.” “A is pref. to C.” 
1/3 of the electorate Yes Yes Yes 
1/3 of the electorate No Yes No 
1/3 of the electorate Yes No No 
Table 4: Condorcet’s paradox revisited 
Condorcet’s paradox can thus be interpreted as a special case of the more general 
democratic trilemma. The trilemma quantifies over all but the simplest collective decision 
problems involving the formation of intentional attitudes (of an acceptance–rejection 
kind) and all decision procedures and shows that, whichever procedure we pick, at least 
one of our three requirements will be violated. Condorcet’s paradox shows that, in a 
decision on how to rank three or more options, the particular procedure of majority rule 
fails to deliver a rational collective output for the particular combination of inputs 
constructed by Condorcet.  
In short, Condorcet did identify what can go wrong with majority rule in decisions 
involving the ranking of options, but he did not have the axiomatic tools to conceptualize 
this as an instance of a more general trade-off between different requirements on a 
democratic procedure. At the end of this paper, I will relate the democratic trilemma to 
the best-known modern generalization of Condorcet’s paradox, Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, and to one of Sen’s famous results. 
V. A MAP OF THE LOGICAL SPACE 
I have shown that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of 
democracy. Any decision procedure will either fail to be fully robust to pluralism in its 
input, or sometimes overrule majorities, or sometimes deliver an incomplete or even 
inconsistent collective output. Depending on which “horn” of the trilemma we choose, 
and how we do so, we arrive at a different conception of democracy. In what follows, I 
will provide a rough map of the resulting logical space. I will keep the discussion as non-
technical as possible and focus on general ideas, rather than details. A more fine-grained 
map could be given by drawing further on technical work in social choice theory. 
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Relaxing robustness to pluralism 
One way to avoid the trilemma is to restrict the domain of admissible inputs to the 
democratic procedure. On this approach, the procedure is no longer required to cope with 
all possible combinations of consistent and complete individual attitudes, but only with 
those that satisfy some additional constraints. Crucially, those constraints must be strong 
enough to ensure that a procedure such as majority rule will never generate inconsistent 
outputs. The weakened robustness requirement will then be compatible with basic 
majoritarianism and collective rationality. 
If the procedure had to cope only with unanimous individual attitudes, to give the 
simplest example, then majority rule would obviously work without violating basic 
majoritarianism or collective rationality, assuming individual rationality. However, full 
unanimity is only sufficient, but not necessary for this happy result. Even certain forms of 
partial consensus or cohesion among individual attitudes are enough. In the technical 
literature, several “domain-restriction” conditions on combinations of individual attitudes 
have been identified that are sufficient to guarantee consistent majority outcomes.24  
The most easily interpretable such conditions take the form of requiring a certain 
kind of “meta-consensus” among the individuals, a consensus not on what the right 
attitudes are, but on what the disagreement is about.25 Suppose, for example, the 
individuals can be aligned from left to right on some cognitive or political axis, such as 
from socio-economic left to socio-economic right, from secular to religious, or from 
urban to rural. Suppose, further, this axis structures the disagreement among the 
individuals in the sense that, for every proposition on the agenda, the individuals 
accepting the proposition lie on the opposite side of those rejecting it. This pattern may 
be plausible at least in some political contexts. Left-leaning individuals and right-leaning 
                                                 
24
 See Duncan Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making,” Journal of Political Economy 56 
(1948): 23–34. Other key contributions include K.-I. Inada, “A Note on the Simple Majority Decision 
Rule,” Econometrica 32 (1964): 525–31; and Amartya K. Sen, “A Possibility Theorem on Majority 
Decisions,” Econometrica 34 (1966): 491–99. For a survey of the literature and more recent results, see 
Wulf Gaertner, Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); and Dietrich and List, “Majority voting on restricted domains,” Journal of Economic Theory 145 
(2010): 512–43. 
25
 On the notion of “meta-consensus” and the pattern of “unidimensional alignment” as discussed here, see 
List, “Two Concepts of Agreement,” The Good Society 11 (2002): 72–9. For some further, subsequent 
notions of “meta-consensus,” see John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, “Reconciling pluralism and consensus 
as political ideals,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (2006): 634–49. 
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ones often fall on opposite sides with respect to many political issues, from redistributive 
policies to military interventions. If this pattern holds, the majority attitudes will coincide 
with the individual attitudes of whoever occupies the median position on the relevant left-
right axis, that is, the individual who has an equal number of others to the left and to the 
right. So long as the median individual’s attitudes are consistent, majority rule then 
produces a perfectly consistent outcome, and even one that can be seen as a compromise 
by occupying a centrist political position. Another well-known domain-restriction 
condition that allows a “meta-consensus” interpretation, and which applies specifically to 
Condorcetian preference aggregation problems, is that of “single-peakedness.”26 Here it 
is not the individuals, but the decision options, which have to be aligned from left to right 
on some shared cognitive or political axis. The details do not matter for present purposes. 
The point is that if we require the decision procedure to work only under conditions of 
suitably restricted—or “structured”—pluralism, then the democratic trilemma goes away. 
How plausible is this escape route from the trilemma? When we design a 
democratic decision procedure for a given group or society, how much can we rely on the 
occurrence of the necessary forms of cohesion or partial consensus among the decision 
makers? In answer to this question, we can distinguish between “exogenous” and 
“endogenous” approaches to limiting pluralism. On the exogenous approach, a certain 
level of cohesion or attitudinal homogeneity is taken to be a precondition for democratic 
decision making. The key idea is that democracy cannot get off the ground unless 
pluralism in the relevant group or society is sufficiently limited. Communitarians or 
liberal proponents of the traditional nation state, for example, may find this idea 
plausible.27 They are likely to interpret the democratic trilemma as reinforcing a point 
they already make in other contexts, namely that democracy works well only when 
individual attitudes are sufficiently cohesive—in particular, when the members of the 
relevant society, while disagreeing on many issues, do not disagree too deeply. Similarly, 
some versions of the view, held by some political liberals, that democracy can cope only 
                                                 
26
 See Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making.” The significance of Black’s result was 
emphasized even by the critic of populist democracy, William Riker, in Liberalism against Populism (at p. 
128): “If, by reason of discussion, debate, civic education, and political socialization, voters have a 
common view of the political dimension (as evidenced by single-peakedness), then a transitive outcome is 
guaranteed.” 
27
 Classic contributions include Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983); and 
David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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with “reasonable” disagreement, under a sufficiently demanding notion of 
“reasonableness,” may be interpreted as suggesting certain constraints on pluralism as a 
precondition for democratic decision making.28 
On the endogenous approach to limiting pluralism, by contrast, the required level of 
cohesion among the decision makers is not taken to be a precondition for setting up 
democratic institutions in the first place, but is expected as the outcome of certain 
structuration processes within the democratic system. In particular, the aim is to set up 
democratic institutions so as to shape individual attitudes through education or 
deliberation in a way that enables consistent majoritarian decision making.29 Those 
democrats who emphasize the importance of opinion formation through education, 
political participation and deliberation, beyond the democratic decision procedure 
narrowly construed, are likely to support this response to the democratic trilemma. Even 
in Robert Dahl’s primarily procedurally oriented account of democracy, the presence, or 
promotion, of an “enlightened understanding” among the decision makers, which can be 
seen as a deliberative democratic ideal, is one of the broader requirements of democracy, 
over and above the thinnest necessary conditions.30  
Of course, the present proposal is a demanding one, and its success depends on 
certain contingent features of the democratic process. The central question is whether the 
patterns of individual attitudes that give rise to inconsistent majority outcomes as in 
Condorcet’s paradox or in the government and expert-panel examples would go away 
after sufficient deliberation. Evidence from deliberative opinion polls suggests that, under 
certain conditions, deliberation in groups of a few hundred people can promote the forms 
of cohesion needed to avoid inconsistent majority outcomes,31 but the generalizability of 
those findings to larger settings has not yet been fully explored.  
                                                 
28
 For a related discussion, see Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and 
Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
29
 See, e.g., David Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice,” Political Studies 40 [special issue] 
(1992): 54–67; Jack Knight and James Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of 
Democratic Legitimacy,” Political Theory 22 (1994): 277–96; and John Dryzek and Christian List, “Social 
Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation,” British Journal of Political Science 33 
(2003): 1–28. 
30
 See, e.g., Dahl, “Procedural Democracy.” 
31
 See Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James Fishkin and Iain McLean, “Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, 
and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls,” working paper (London 
School of Economics, 2000/2006). 
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In summary, the first escape route from the democratic trilemma should appeal to 
communitarians as well as deliberative democrats, although they may be divided on 
whether the exogenous or the endogenous variant is more attractive. 
Relaxing basic majoritarianism 
A second way to avoid the trilemma is to relax the requirement that majority acceptance 
is generally necessary for the collective acceptance of any proposition, and instead to 
allow the majority to be overruled on some propositions on the agenda. Like the previous 
escape route from the trilemma, the present route can take several forms.  
On one variant, which we may call the “exogenous” one, different propositions are 
explicitly given a different status, and each proposition’s status is taken to determine 
whether, and if so when, the majority attitude on it can be overruled. For example, some 
propositions may be deemed “prior” to others, where the order of priority is given on a 
temporal, logical or epistemic basis and where respecting the majority attitudes on 
propositions higher in that order is taken to be more important than respecting the 
majority attitudes on lower ones.32 So, if the majority view on a fairly peripheral matter 
clashes with the majority commitment on a more fundamental, perhaps constitutional 
matter, then the majority on the derivative matter may be overruled for the sake of 
achieving consistency with the more fundamental commitment, but not the other way 
round. An extension of this idea would be to make the attitudes on some privileged 
propositions, such as propositions about “inalienable rights,” completely unrevisable.  
In the technical literature, several decision procedures have been formalized that 
capture the idea of prioritizing some propositions over others and letting the propositions’ 
status determine whether, and when, majority attitudes can be overruled.33 Some of these 
procedures have become known as “premise-based” or “sequential priority procedures” 
and involve taking majority votes on certain fundamental “premises” first and then using 
the resulting majority attitudes as a basis for deriving the collective attitudes on other, 
                                                 
32
 For non-technical discussions of this idea, see Pettit, “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive 
Dilemma,” List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments,” and Chapman, “Rational Aggregation.” 
33
 See, e.g., List, “A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions,” American 
Political Science Review 98 (2004): 495–513; Dietrich, “Aggregation theory and the relevance of some 
issues to others,” working paper (London School of Economics, 2006); and Franz Dietrich and Philippe 
Mongin, “The premise-based approach to judgment aggregation,” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2010): 
562–82. 
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less fundamental propositions—the “conclusions.” As before, the technical details do not 
matter here. In the real world, some forms of precedent-based decision making, as well as 
some forms of judicial review, can be seen as instances of this exogenous way of relaxing 
basic majoritarianism. The judicial version is, of course, precisely the kind of restriction 
on majoritarianism that Jeremy Waldron, in his much-cited critique of judicial review, 
objects to.34 Interestingly, Waldron’s argument against judicial review rests on the 
premise that citizens share a certain commitment to rights, broadly defined, which can in 
fact be interpreted as a constraint on pluralism in the present terms. 
A second way to relax basic majoritarianism may be described as the “endogenous” 
one. Here, there is no proposition on which the majority is always guaranteed to prevail. 
Instead, whether the majority attitude is allowed to stand as the collective attitude on any 
proposition is endogenous to the democratic process. For example, the decision-making 
group may engage in some collective “reflective equilibrium” process, in which the 
group seeks to arrive at the most coherent collective extrapolation, or rational 
reconstruction, of its members’ attitudes.35 The group may begin by taking the majority 
attitudes on all propositions as its provisional attitudes and then identify the most 
plausible—perhaps least invasive—way to revise them to achieve overall coherence. In 
the real world, certain forms of legislative deliberation or collective reasoning, when 
successful, might approximate this ideal. In technical work, so-called “distance-based” 
decision procedures have been proposed, according to which the collective attitudes are 
chosen to minimize the total “distance” from individual attitudes, subject to the constraint 
of collective consistency.36  
Another example of a decision procedure that sacrifices basic majoritarianism in 
what I have described as an endogenous manner, while satisfying robustness to pluralism 
                                                 
34
 E.g., Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 115 (2006): 
1346–406. 
35
 The idea of “reflective equilibrium” goes back, of course, to John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). In a judgment-aggregation context, a proposal along the 
present lines is discussed in List and Pettit, Group Agency, ch. 3. 
36
 See, e.g., Sébastien Konieczny and Ramón Pino Pérez, “Merging information under constraints: a logical 
framework,” Journal of Logic and Computation 12 (2002): 773–808; Gabriella Pigozzi, “Belief merging 
and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation,” Synthese 
152 (2006): 285–98; and Michael K. Miller and Dan Osherson, “Methods for distance-based judgment 
aggregation,” Social Choice and Welfare 32 (2009): 575–601. In the special case of preference aggregation, 
the so-called “Kemeny method” is a well-known such distance-based decision procedure. 
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and collective rationality, is Borda’s method mentioned earlier, which is applicable in the 
case of preference aggregation. Since this method ranks options by summing up the 
scores implicit in the voters’ rankings of them, it always produces a consistent and 
complete outcome, but it can—depending on the pattern of individual preferences—
sometimes yield pairwise rankings of options that reverse the corresponding majority 
preferences.37 Again, my aim here is not to offer a detailed account of the present escape 
route from the democratic trilemma, but just to locate it on the map.  
In summary, there are some recognizably democratic approaches to collective 
decision making that give up basic majoritarianism. These may involve precedent-based 
decision making, judicial review, something like the Borda method, or alternatively 
collective reasoning so as to implement the idea of a “reflective equilibrium.” It is 
interesting to observe how these approaches differ from the ones we encountered in the 
earlier discussion of relaxing robustness to pluralism. 
Relaxing collective rationality 
The third way to avoid the democratic trilemma is to give up the requirement that 
collective attitudes must always be consistent and complete. We can relax this 
requirement in at least two ways: we can drop either the consistency part or the 
completeness part (or both). Since we are interested in collective decision making, 
however, the collective attitudes must provide some degree of action-guidance, and 
violations of consistency would compromise this very significantly, if not rule it out 
altogether.38 So, although giving up collective consistency is a logical possibility, I will 
not pursue it further here. Instead, I will focus on relaxing collective completeness. At 
first, we may also be reluctant to go along that route. The idea that the group should form 
a decisive view on every proposition–negation pair on the agenda seems well-motivated 
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 On arguments for and against the Borda method, see, for example, the debate between Mathias Risse, 
who advocates a variant of the Kemeny method (which, he argues, is Condorcetian in spirit), and Donald 
Saari, who advocates Borda’s method. See Risse, “Arrow's Theorem, Indeterminacy, and Multiplicity 
Reconsidered,” Ethics 111 (2001): 706–34; and Saari, “Capturing the ‘Will of the People’,” Ethics 113 
(2003): 333–49; followed by Risse, “Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet,” 
Social Choice and Welfare 25 (2005): 95–113; and Saari, “Which is better: the Condorcet or Borda 
winner?” Social Choice and Welfare 26 (2006): 107–29. 
38
 It is well-known that inconsistent attitudes make a decision maker—individual as well as collective—
vulnerable to various forms of strategic exploitation by others, quite apart from the fact that, at least in 
classical logical terms, anything can be derived from an inconsistent set of commitments. 
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by the fact that all these propositions were put on the agenda in the first place—
presumably because a decision on them was needed. But since one of the three 
requirements leading to the trilemma has to go, it makes sense to explore what happens if 
we relax collective completeness. 
Again, it is useful to distinguish between “exogenous” and “endogenous” variants 
of the present route. On an “exogenous” approach, the agenda is partitioned in advance 
into those propositions that require adjudication, and those on which no collective 
attitude is needed. A procedure such as majority rule is then applied to the first set of 
propositions, while the group refrains from forming attitudes on the second.39 Crucially, 
the first set of propositions must be specified so as to avoid any non-trivial logical 
connections between them, because otherwise the majority attitudes on them could still 
be inconsistent. But, assuming no such connections between propositions in the first set, 
and collective “abstention” on the second, overall consistency will be achieved, albeit at 
the cost of producing incomplete collective attitudes. A decision procedure along these 
lines is sometimes called a “conclusion-based procedure.” In the earlier government 
example, the cabinet as a whole might vote only on whether to invade country X, while 
not forming any collective views on the underlying empirical and normative premises.  
We may or may not find this approach plausible. On some conceptions of 
democracy, making decisions not only on action-propositions but also on underlying 
reasons is a key requirement for democratic accountability, which would be violated 
here.40 However, Cass Sunstein has advocated an approach along the present lines in 
certain judicial settings, suggesting that judges should make decisions in a thin and 
foundationally uncommitted manner. A similar proposal could be made with regard to 
some international contexts or deeply divided societies, where agreements on anything 
beyond narrowly defined action-propositions may be too difficult to reach.41 Sunstein has 
introduced the term “incompletely theorized agreements” to refer to agreements on thinly 
specified practical matters without agreeing on the more fundamental supporting reasons. 
Incompletely theorized decision making is a real-world example of the present approach 
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 List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments,” and List, “The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason.” 
40
 See, e.g., Pettit, “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.” 
41
 See, in particular, Cass Sunstein, Political Conflict and Legal Agreement, Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (Harvard University, 1994); and One case at a time: judicial minimalism on the Supreme Court 
(Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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to relaxing collective completeness. Likewise, a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus” can 
be interpreted as an incompletely theorized agreement on a public conception of justice 
without an agreement on any underlying comprehensive moral doctrines. 
Depending on whether the distinction between “practical conclusions” and 
“underlying reasons” can be drawn in advance, or whether it is the outcome of the 
political process, incompletely theorized decision making may instantiate not only an 
exogenous approach to relaxing collective completeness, but also an endogenous one. On 
the endogenous approach, the agenda is not partitioned in advance into those propositions 
on which a collective decision is needed and those on which it is not, but a collective 
attitude on any proposition is formed only if there is a sufficiently strong agreement on it 
or, in the limit, a consensus. It can be shown that a supermajority rule with a sufficiently 
high threshold for the acceptance of any proposition (as well as for the acceptance of its 
negation) always guarantees consistent collective judgments.42 A feature of such a 
procedure is that even relatively small minorities can veto the collective acceptance of 
any proposition. While this may protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority, a 
negative consequence is that even groups with relatively mild disagreements will be at 
risk of stalemate, that is, often unable to reach any decisions. In the real world, many 
international organizations, including the UN Security Council or the EU Council of 
Ministers operate in this strongly consensual manner. Despite the difficulties involved, 
the approach is a possible response to the democratic trilemma.43 
Both exogenous and endogenous approaches to relaxing collective completeness 
give up the idea that the group as a whole should live up to the same stringent demands 
on intentional attitudes that we typically expect an individual decision maker to meet. 
These approaches thus reflect a “minimalist” conception of democracy, under which a 
democratic group is not viewed as a collective agent in its own right, but only as a loose 
collection of disparate individuals.44  
                                                 
42
 The acceptance threshold for any proposition must be above (k–1)/k, where k is the size of the largest 
“minimal inconsistent” subset of the agenda (a measure of its “complexity”). See Dietrich and List, 
“Judgment aggregation by quota rules.” In the examples above, k = 3 and thus a decision procedure 
requiring more than two thirds of the individuals for the acceptance of any proposition would guarantee 
consistent—albeit incomplete—collective attitudes.   
43
 Relatedly, on “symmetrical supermajority rules,” see Goodin and List, “Special Majorities Rationalized.” 
44
 On the notion of group agency, see List and Pettit, Group Agency. 
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Figure 2 shows the simple map of the logical space of democracy I have sketched. 
The large oval represents the space of all possible decision procedures for a given non-
trivial decision problem, and the three circular regions represent the sets of decision 
procedures satisfying the requirements introduced. Graphically, the democratic trilemma 
consists in the fact that the intersection of the three circular regions is empty, while there 
is a non-empty overlap between any two of them; it is these regions that I have explored. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The logical space of democracy 
VI. THE DEMOCRATIC TRILEMMA AS A GENERAL TEMPLATE 
In conclusion, it is helpful to put the trilemma and the present cartographic exercise into a 
broader context. I have identified a conflict between the requirements of robustness to 
pluralism, basic majoritarianism and collective rationality. More abstractly, these can be 
described as “input,” “responsiveness” and “output” conditions on a democratic 
procedure. Input conditions specify what inputs the procedure should accept; 
responsiveness conditions specify how the procedure’s outputs should respond to these 
inputs; and output conditions specify what formal or other constraints the resulting 
outputs should obey. Robustness to pluralism, basic majoritarianism and collective 
rationality are perhaps the most paradigmatic instances of such conditions. 
Although this terminology is not normally used, several prominent impossibility 
results of social choice theory can be interpreted as conflicts between certain input, 
responsiveness and output conditions, on the model of the democratic trilemma. I will 
briefly illustrate this by reference to Arrow’s impossibility theorem and Sen’s “liberal 
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paradox.” Both results concern preference aggregation problems in Condorcet’s tradition, 
where, as discussed above, a group of individuals has to rank some options in an order of 
collective preference, based on the group members’ individual preferences.  
Arrow’s theorem states that, when there are three or more options, there exists no 
preference aggregation procedure satisfying the following five conditions:45 
Universal domain: The procedure accepts as admissible input any possible 
combination of rational individual preference orderings on the given options. 
Ordering: The procedure produces as collective output a rational collective 
preference ordering on the given options. 
Weak Pareto principle: If all individuals prefer an option A to another 
option B, then so does the group. 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives: The collective preference between 
any two options depends only on the individual preferences between these 
two options, not on individual preferences involving other options. 
Non-dictatorship: There is no fixed individual who always determines the 
collective preference. 
The main point for present purposes is that these five conditions can be neatly subdivided 
into input, output and responsiveness conditions, following the template of the 
democratic trilemma. Universal domain and ordering are simply what the conditions of 
robustness to pluralism and collective rationality reduce to when applied to the case of 
preference aggregation, and they therefore constitute Arrow’s input and output 
conditions. Arrow’s other three conditions—the weak Pareto principle, independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship—are instances of responsiveness conditions; 
they constrain the way the individual inputs and the collective outputs hang together. In 
fact, the latter three conditions, together with universal domain, are satisfied by majority 
rule, which falls short only with regard to ordering, as we have already seen. In essence, 
Arrow’s theorem can be described as a variant of the democratic trilemma in the case of 
                                                 
45
 See Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values. 
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preference aggregation, where basic majoritarianism is replaced by the conjunction of the 
weak Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. 
Next, let us turn to Sen’s theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Sen’s 
result states that there exists no preference aggregation procedure satisfying the following 
four conditions:46 
Universal domain: As in Arrow’s theorem. 
Ordering: As in Arrow’s theorem, although Sen’s result also holds for a 
slightly weaker acyclicity condition. 
Weak Pareto principle: As in Arrow’s theorem. 
Minimal liberalism: At least two individuals—call them i and j—are 
decisive on at least one pair of options each; that is, there is at least one pair 
of options on which i always determines the collective preference, and 
another pair on which j does so. (These pairs of options are usually 
interpreted as affecting the personal spheres of i and j, respectively.) 
Again, we can reinterpret this result in the present terms. As already noted, universal 
domain and ordering are special cases of the democratic trilemma’s input and output 
conditions. The responsiveness conditions of Sen’s liberal paradox—the weak Pareto 
principle and minimal liberalism—depart further from the one of the democratic 
trilemma. In Sen’s result, the emphasis is placed on respect for individual rights rather 
than basic majoritarianism. Still, it is instructive to see that Sen’s theorem, too, can be 
presented as a conflict between an input condition, an output condition and a particular 
set of responsiveness conditions (albeit not of a majoritarian kind).  
In this way, both Sen’s and Arrow’s theorems lend themselves to a cartographic 
exercise akin to the one sketched in this paper. Since each of these theorems uses 
multiple responsiveness conditions, not just one, we can naturally arrive at an even more 
fine-grained analysis of the logical space of relevant possibilities, by relaxing each of the 
responsiveness conditions individually. The main lesson for present purposes, however, 
                                                 
46
 See Amartya K. Sen, “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal,” Journal of Political Economy 78 (1970): 
152–57. 
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is that the democratic trilemma offers a general template in terms of which many social-
choice-theoretic results can be framed, as illustrated in Table 5.47 
 Democratic trilemma Arrow’s theorem Sen’s liberal paradox 
Relevant decision 
problems 
Binary propositional 
attitude aggregation in 
general 
Preference aggregation Preference aggregation 
Input condition(s) Robustness to pluralism Universal domain Universal domain 
Responsiveness 
condition(s) 
Basic majoritarianism Weak Pareto principle 
Indep. of irr. alternatives 
Non-dictatorship 
Weak Pareto principle 
Minimal liberalism 
Output 
condition(s) 
Collective rationality Ordering Ordering/acyclicity 
Table 5: Conditions leading to an impossibility 
Although I have focused here on drawing a simple map of the logical space of 
democracy, the idea of “cartography of logical space” can be generalized to many other 
contested political concepts, well beyond the realm of social choice theory and the theory 
of democracy. For any such concept, a cartographic exercise of the present kind would 
involve the following steps.48  
First identify a number of desiderata that any good instantiation of the concept 
might be expected to satisfy. It is perfectly acceptable for this initial list of desiderata to 
be such that no single philosophical view endorses them all. If these desiderata are 
mutually compatible, we are in the happy position of being able to fulfil them all at once, 
and we do not face any trade-offs. More often than not, however, the different desiderata 
will be in conflict, and this explains why the concept in question is a contested one.  
The next step is to formulate the logically weakest variants of the desiderata for 
which their mutual incompatibility persists. In this “thinned-out” formulation, the 
desiderata should be “maximally independent” from one another: if there are k desiderata 
in total, any subset of k–1 or fewer of them should be mutually consistent and compatible 
                                                 
47
 This template is relevant not only to impossibility results, but also to possibility results where certain 
conditions characterize a non-empty class of decision procedures. Many such results can be interpreted in 
the present terms too, by classifying the relevant conditions as input, responsiveness and output conditions. 
48
 For a comprehensive review and helpful methodological discussion of the axiomatic method as it is used 
in a number of different areas of economic theory, see again Thomson, “On the axiomatic method and its 
recent applications to game theory and resource allocation.” 
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with the negation of the others. Arriving at this thinned-out set of desiderata may require 
a certain amount of “reflective equilibration” on the part of the cartographer.  
Once we have reached this point, we are able to draw a map of the relevant logical 
space, following the template of the democratic trilemma. And while we will not have 
resolved the conflict between the different desiderata, we will have achieved a better 
understanding of what the conflict is about and what solutions are and are not possible. 
With essentially contested concepts such as democracy, this may be the best we can do. 
APPENDIX: THE GENERALITY OF THE TRILEMMA 
The two examples I have given in the main text show that, for the given decision 
problems, there do not exist any decision procedures satisfying robustness to pluralism, 
basic majoritarianism and collective rationality. To see that this problem goes beyond 
these examples, we must introduce some additional concepts.  
As noted, any decision problem can be modelled in terms of the agenda of 
propositions under consideration, together with the appropriate consistency constraints. 
By definition, the agenda is not a consistent set, since it contains proposition–negation 
pairs. But some of its subsets are consistent, while others are not. If the agenda contains 
propositions ‘p’, ‘if p then q’, ‘q’ and their negations, for example, as in the expert-panel 
case, then the subset consisting of the three un-negated propositions is consistent, while 
the subset consisting of ‘p’, ‘if p then q’, and ‘not-q’ is not. One class of subsets that is 
particularly important for our analysis is the class of “minimally inconsistent” ones. A set 
of propositions is called “minimally inconsistent” if it is inconsistent but all its proper 
subsets are consistent (so the removal of any of its members suffices to restore 
consistency). The set consisting of ‘p’, ‘if p then q’, and ‘not-q’, for example, is 
minimally inconsistent, since it is inconsistent but the removal of any one of the three 
propositions suffices to restore consistency. The set consisting of ‘p’, ‘not-p’, and ‘q’, by 
contrast, is not minimally inconsistent, since its inconsistency does not go away even 
after removing some of its elements: if we remove ‘q’, the inconsistency between ‘p’ and 
‘not-p’ remains in place. It turns out that one can characterize the generality of the 
democratic trilemma in terms of what the minimally inconsistent subsets of the agenda 
are like. 
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The generality of the democratic trilemma: The trilemma applies to a 
given decision problem if and only if the agenda under consideration has at 
least one minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions.49  
To establish this, it suffices to show that combinations of individual attitudes structurally 
similar to those in the government and expert-panel examples can occur if and only if the 
agenda has at least one minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions. Let 
me first consider the “only if” part of this claim, and then turn to the “if” part. 
It should be evident that just as majority rule can never generate any inconsistent 
outputs when there is only a single proposition–negation pair to be voted on, majority 
rule cannot generate any inconsistencies when every minimally inconsistent subset of the 
agenda is structurally similar to a proposition–negation pair. Since majority rule always 
produces complete collective attitudes (setting aside ties50) and satisfies robustness to 
pluralism and basic majoritarianism, it then constitutes a decision procedure satisfying 
our three requirements. Thus the democratic trilemma does not arise when the agenda has 
no minimally inconsistent subset of more than two propositions.  
The other direction of the argument requires showing that if the agenda has at least 
one such subset, then the trilemma arises. Suppose there is a minimally inconsistent 
subset of the agenda containing three or more propositions; call it S. Let us pick out three 
distinct elements of S and label them ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘r’. Suppose, for the sake of argument, 
there is a decision procedure satisfying robustness to pluralism, basic majoritarianism and 
collective rationality. Consider the combination of individual attitudes shown in Table 6. 
For simplicity, Table 6 shows only the individuals’ attitudes towards the propositions in 
S, not towards all propositions on the agenda. Although the individuals can be assumed to 
have views on those other propositions too, these can be set aside for present purposes. 
Notice that each individual rejects precisely one of the propositions in S, and so his or her 
                                                 
49
 For proofs that majority voting guarantees consistent collective attitudes if and only if the agenda has no 
minimally inconsistent subset of more than two propositions, see Dietrich and List, “Judgment aggregation 
by quota rules,” and Nehring and Puppe, “The structure of strategy-proof social choice.” For earlier related 
results, see Nehring and Puppe, “Strategyproof Social Choice on Single-Peaked Domains.” Strictly 
speaking, without technical caveats, the “if and only if” claim requires an odd number of individuals. 
50
 Majority ties are possible only when the number of individuals is even. I set the technicalities raised by 
ties aside here and implicitly assume, for the sake of simplicity, an odd number of individuals. 
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attitudes are consistent (since S is minimally inconsistent, the rejection of any one 
proposition in it suffices to restore consistency among the rest).  
  ‘p’ ‘q’ ‘r’ Other propositions in S (if any) 
1/3 of the individuals Yes Yes No All accepted 
1/3 of the individuals Yes No Yes All accepted 
1/3 of the individuals No Yes Yes All accepted 
Table 6: A combination of individual attitudes 
By robustness to pluralism, the given combination of individual attitudes is 
admissible as input to the decision procedure. What are the resulting collective attitudes? 
By basic majoritarianism, the group must either adopt the majority attitude on any given 
proposition, or be silent on it. In light of the majority views displayed in Table 6, the 
group must either accept each of ‘p’, ‘q’, and ‘r’, as well as all other propositions in S (if 
any), or be silent on one or more of these propositions. The completeness part of 
collective rationality, however, rules out silence with respect to any of these propositions, 
so that the group has no choice but to accept all of ‘p’, ‘q’, ‘r’ and the rest of the 
propositions in S. But this means that all of S, an inconsistent set, is collectively 
accepted, which violates the consistency part of the collective rationality requirement. 
This completes the argument.  
It should now be clear what is meant by the claim that the democratic trilemma 
applies to “all but the simplest collective decision problems”: it applies to all decision 
problems except those in which all minimally inconsistent subsets of the agenda have two 
or fewer elements.51 The latter are the “simplest” decision problems insofar as they are 
structurally similar to one or several logically unconnected binary choices. Note that 
although the construction of individual attitudes in Table 6 implicitly assumed the overall 
number of individuals to be divisible by three, the argument can be generalized to any 
number of individuals. For the purposes of this paper, I set these technicalities aside.52 
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 For further discussions of this structure condition on an agenda (the “simplicity” or “median” property), 
see Nehring and Puppe, “The structure of strategy-proof social choice,” Dietrich and List, “Judgment 
aggregation by quota rules,” and Nehring and Puppe, “Abstract Arrovian Aggregation.”  
52
 To avoid a trivial conflict between basic majoritarianism and collective completeness in the case of a 
majority tie, one may demand completeness only in the absence of a majority tie. The trilemma can then be 
shown to hold for all group sizes except 2 and, in case the largest minimally inconsistent subset of the 
agenda has exactly three elements, 4. This follows from a result in Dietrich and List, “Judgment 
aggregation by quota rules.” 
